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Viktor Suvorov. Spetsnaz. The Inside Story of
the Soviet Special Force |
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Before spetsnaz units can begin active operations behind the enemy’s lines they have to get there. The Soviet high command has the choice of either sending
spetsnaz troops behind the enemy’s lines before the outbreak of war, or sending them there after war
has broken out. In the first case the enemy may discover
them, realise that war has already begun and possibly press the buttons to start a nuclear war—pre-empting the Soviet
Union. But if spetsnaz troops
are sent in after the outbreak of war, it may be too late. The enemy may already have activated
its nuclear capability, and then there will be nothing to put out of
action in the enemy’s rear: the missiles will be on their way to Soviet territory. One potential solution to the dilemma is that the better, smaller part of spetsnaz—the
professional athletes --
arrives before all-out war starts, taking extreme measures not to be discovered, while the standard units penetrate behind enemy lines
after war has started. In every Soviet embassy
there are two secret
organisations—the KGB
rezidentura and the GRU rezidentura. The embassy and the KGB rezidentura
are guarded by officers of the KGB frontier troops, but in cases where the GRU rezidentura has a complement of more than ten officers, it has its own internal spetsnaz guard.
Before the outbreak of a war, in some cases several months previously, the
number of spetsnaz officers
in a Soviet embassy may be
substantially increased, to the point where practically all the auxiliary
personnel in the embassy, performing the duties of guards, cleaners, radio-operators, cooks
and mechanics, will be
spetsnaz athletes. With them, as their ‘wives’, women athletes from spetsnaz may turn up in the
embassy. Similar changes of staff may take place in the many
other Soviet bodies— the consulate, the commercial representation, the offices of Aeroflot, Intourist, TASS, Novosti
and so forth. The advantages of this
arrangement are obvious, but
it is not without its
dangers. The principal danger lies in the fact that these new terrorist groups are based right in the centre of the country’s capital city, uncomfortably close to
government offices and surveillance. But within days, possibly within hours, before the outbreak of war
they can, with care, make contact with the spetsnaz agent network and start a real war in the very centre of the city, using
hiding places already prepared. Part of their support will
come from other spetsnaz
groups which have recently
arrived in the country in the guise of tourists, teams of sportsmen and
various delegations. And at the very last moment large groups of fighting men may suddenly appear out of Aeroflot planes, ships in port, trains and Soviet long-distance road transport (‘Sovtransavto’). Simultaneously there may be a secret landing of spetsnaz troops
from Soviet submarines and surface
vessels, both naval and merchant. (Small fishing vessels make an excellent means of transport for spetsnaz. They naturally spend long periods in
the coastal waters of foreign states and do not arouse suspicion, so spetsnaz groups can spend a long time
aboard and can easily return
home if they do not get an order to make a landing). At the critical moment, on receipt of a
signal, they can make a
landing on the coast using
aqualungs and small boats.
Spetsnaz groups arriving by Aeroflot can adopt much the same tactics. In a period of
tension, a system of regular
watches may be introduced. This means that among the passengers on every
plane there will be a group
of commandos. Having arrived at their intended airport and not having been given
a signal, they can remain
aboard the aircraft1 and go back on the next flight. Next day another group will
make the trip, and so on. One
day the signal will come, and the group will leave the plane and
start fighting right in the country’s main airport. Their main task is to capture the airport for the
benefit of a fresh wave
of spetsnaz troops or airborne units
(VDV). 1 An aircraft
is considered to be part of
the territory of the country to which it belongs, and the pilot’s cabin
and the interior of the plane are not subject to foreign
supervision. It is a well-known fact that the ‘liberation’ of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 began with the arrival at Prague airport of Soviet military transport planes
with VDV troops on board. The
airborne troops did not need parachutes; the planes simply landed at the airport. Before the troops disembarked there was a
moment when both the aircraft and their passengers
were completely defenceless. Was
the Soviet high command not taking a risk? No, because the fact is that by the time the planes landed, Prague airport
had already been largely paralysed by a group of ‘tourists’ who had arrived
earlier. Spetsnaz groups may turn up in the territory of an enemy from the territory of neutral states. Before the outbreak of war or during a war spetsnaz groups
may penetrate secretly into
the territory of neutral states and wait there for an agreed signal or
until a previously agreed
time. One of the advantages of this is that the enemy does not watch over his frontiers with neutral
countries as carefully as he
does over his frontiers with Communist countries. The arrival of a spetsnaz group from a neutral state may pass
unnoticed both by the enemy and the neutral state. But what happens if the group is discovered on neutral territory?
The answer is simple: the group will go into action in the same way as in enemy
territory—avoid being followed, kill any witnesses, use force and cunning
to halt any pursuers. They will make every effort to ensure that nobody
from the group gets into
the hands of their pursuers and not to leave any evidence about to show that the group belongs to the armed
forces of the USSR. If the group should be captured by the authorities of the neutral state, Soviet diplomacy has enormous experience and some well-tried counter-moves. It
may admit its mistake, make an official apology and offer compensation for
any damage caused; it may
declare that the group lost
its way and thought it was already in enemy territory; or it may accuse the neutral state of having
deliberately seized a group of members of the Soviet armed forces on Soviet territory for provocative purposes, and demand explanations, apologies and
compensation, accompanied by open threats. protecting our
frontiers.’3
2 Marshal
K. A. Meretskov, Na
Sluzhbe narodu (In the Service of the People),
1968. 3 Marshal A. M.
Vasilevsky, Delo Vsei gesnie (A Life’s Work),
1968. The Soviet Union is always innocent: it only repels perfidious aggressors. On other
people’s territory. The principal way of delivering the main body of spetsnaz to the enemy’s rear after
the outbreak of war is to
drop them by parachute. In the course of his two years’ service every
spetsnaz soldier makes thirty-five to forty parachute jumps. Spetsnaz
professionals and officers have much greater experience with parachutes;
some have thousands of jumps to their credit. The parachute is not just a weapon and a form of transport. It also acts as a
filter which courageous soldiers will pass through, but weak and cowardly men will not. The Soviet Government spends enormous sums on the development of parachute jumping as a sport. This is the main base from which the airborne
troops and spetsnaz are built
up. On 1 January 1985 the FAI
had recorded sixty-three world records in parachute jumping, of which
forty-eight are held by Soviet sportsmen (which means the Soviet Army). The Soviet military athlete Yuri Baranov was the first man in the world to exceed 13,000 jumps. Among Soviet women
the champion in the number of jumps is Aleksandra Shvachko -- she has made 8,200 jumps. The
parachute psychosis continues. In peacetime military transport planes are used for making parachute drops. But this
is done largely to prevent the fact of the existence of spetsnaz from spreading. In
wartime military transports
would be used for dropping spetsnaz groups only
in exceptional circumstances.
There are two reasons for this. In the first
place, the whole fleet of
military transport planes
would be taken up with
transporting the airborne forces
(VDV), of which
there are an enormous number. Apart from which, military aviation would have other difficult missions to perform, such as the
transport of troops within
the country from passive,
less important sectors to the areas where the main fighting was taking
place. Secondly, the majority of military transports are enormous
aircraft, built for moving people and equipment on a large scale, which do not suit the purposes of spetsnaz. It needs
small planes that do not
present large targets and carry no more than
twenty or thirty people. They must also be able to fly at very low level without much noise.
In some cases even smaller aircraft that take eight to ten, or down to three or four
parachutists, are needed. However, the official term ‘civil aviation’, which is
the source of most spetsnaz
transport in wartime, is a
substantial misnomer. The minister for civil aviation bears, quite
officially, the rank of air chief marshal in the Air Force. His deputies bear the rank of generals. The whole of Aeroflot’s flying personnel have the ranks of officers of the reserve. In the
event of war Aeroflot simply merges with the Soviet Air Force, and the reserve officers then become
regular officers with the same rank. It has more than enough
small aircraft for the business of transporting and supplying spetsnaz units. The best of them are the
Yakovlev-42 and the Yakovlev-40, very manoeuvrable, reliable, low-noise
planes capable of flying at very low
altitudes. They have one very important construction feature—
passengers embark and
disembark through a hatch at
the bottom and rear of the
aircraft. If need be, the
hatch cover can be removed altogether, giving the parachutists
an exit as on a military transport plane,
which makes it possible
to drop them in complete safety. Another plane that has great possibilities for spetsnaz is the Antonov-72 -- an exact copy of the American YC-14 of
which the plans were stolen by GRU spies. But how can spetsnaz parachutists use ordinary civil jet-propelled aircraft,
which passengers enter and
leave by side doors? The
doors cannot be opened in
flight. And if they were made to open inwards instead of outwards, it would be
exceptionally dangerous for a parachutist to leave the plane, because the
force of the current of air would press the man back against the body of the
plane. He might be killed either from the force with which he bounced
back against the plane, or through interference with the opening of
his parachute. The problem has been solved by a very simple device. The door is arranged to open inwards, and a wide tube made of strong, flexible, synthetic material is allowed to hang out. As he leaves the door the parachutist finds himself in a sort of three-metre long corridor which he slides down
so that he comes away
from the aircraft when
he is slightly to one side and below the fuselage. Variations on this device were first used on Ilyushin-76 military transport
planes. The heavy equipment of the airborne troops was dropped out of the
huge rear freight hatch,
while at the same time the men were leaving the plane through
flexible ‘sleeves’ at the
side. The West has not given this simple but very clever
invention its due. Its
importance lies not only in the
fact that the time
taken to drop Soviet parachutists from transport planes has been substantially reduced,
with the result that
every drop is safer and that
forces are much better
concentrated on landing. What it also means is that practically any
jet-propelled civil aircraft can now
be used for dropping
parachute troops. The dropping of a spetsnaz
unit can be carried out at
any time of the day or night.
Every time has its advantages and its problems. Night-time is the
spetsnaz soldier’s ally, when the appearance of a group of spetsnaz deep
in the enemy’s rear may not
be noticed at all. Even if the enemy were aware of the group’s
arrival, it is never easy to
organise a full-scale search at night, especially if the exact landing place is not known and may be somewhere inaccessible where there are
forests and hills or
mountains with few roads and no troops on the spot. But at night there
are likely to be casualties among the parachutists as they land. The same problems of assembly and orientation which face the
pursuit troops face the spetsnaz unit
too. During the day, obviously, there are fewer accidents on
landing; but the landing
will be seen. Deliberate daytime landings may sometimes be carried out for the simple
reason that the enemy does not expect such brazen behaviour at such a
time. In many cases the drop will
be carried out early in the morning while there are still
stars in the sky and the sun has not risen. This is
a very good time if large numbers of soldiers are being dropped who are
expected to go straight into battle and carry out their mission by means of a really sudden attack. In that case
the high command does its best to ensure that the groups have as much daylight as
possible for active operations on the first,
most important day of their mission. But every spetsnaz soldier’s favourite time for being dropped is at sunset. The flight
is calculated so that the
parachutists’ drop is carried
out in the last minutes before the onset of darkness. The landing then
takes place in the twilight
when it is still light enough to avoid landing on a
church spire or a telegraph pole. In half an hour at the most
darkness will conceal the men
and they will have the whole night
ahead of them to leave the landing area and
cover their tracks. On its own territory spetsnaz has a standard military structure4: section, platoon, company,
battalion, brigade; or section, platoon, company, regiment. This organisation simplifies the control, administration and battle training of spetsnaz. But this structure cannot be used on enemy
territory. 4 See Appendices for precise organisation of spetsnaz at different
levels. The problem is,
firstly, that every spetsnaz operation is individual and unlike
any other; a plan is worked out for each operation, which is unlike any other. Each
operation consequently requires forces organised, not in a standard
fashion, but adapted to the particular plan. Secondly, when it is on
enemy territory, a spetsnaz
unit is in direct
communication with a major headquarters, at the very least the headquarters of an
all-arm or tank army, and
orders are received in many
cases directly from a high-level HQ. A very long chain of command is
simply not needed. On operations a simple and flexible chain of command is used. The
organisational unit on enemy territory is known officially as the reconnaissance group of spetsnaz (RGSN). A group is formed before the beginning of an operation and may contain from two to thirty men. It can operate
independently or as part of a
detachment (ROSN), which
consists of between thirty
and 300 or more men. The detachment contains groups of various sizes and for various purposes. The
names ‘detachment’ and ‘group’ are used deliberately, to emphasise the temporary nature of the units. In the course of an operation
groups can leave a detachment and join it again, and each group may in turn break up into several smaller groups or, conversely, come together with others into one big group. Several large groups can join up
and form a detachment which can at any moment split up again.
The whole process is usually planned before the operation begins. For
example: the drop may
take place in small groups,
perhaps fifteen of them
altogether. On the second
day of the operation
(D+1) eight of the groups will join up into one detachment for a joint raid,
while the rest operate
independently. On D+2 two groups are taken out of the detachment to form
the basis of a new detachment and another six groups link up with the second
detachment. On D+5 the first detachment splits up into groups and on D+6
the second group splits up, and so on. Before the beginning of the operation each group is informed
where and when to meet up with
the other groups and
what to do in case the rendezvous is not kept. Having landed in enemy territory spetsnaz
may go straight into battle. Otherwise, it will hide the equipment it no longer needs -- boats, parachutes, etc—by either burying them in the ground or sinking them in water.
Very often it will then mine
the drop area. The mines are laid where the unwanted equipment has been
buried. The area is also treated with one of a number of substances which will confuse a dog’s sense of smell. After
that, the group (of whatever size) will break up into
little sub-groups which
depart quickly in
different directions. A
meeting of the sub-groups
will take place later at a
previously arranged spot or, if this proves problematic, at one of the several alternative places which have been agreed. The drop area is usually the first place where casualties occur. However good the parachute training is, leg injuries and fractures
are a frequent
occurrence, and when the drop takes place in an
unfamiliar place, in complete darkness, perhaps in fog, over a forest or
mountains, they are
inevitable. Even built-up areas provide their own hazards. Spetsnaz laws
are simple and easy to understand. In a case of serious injury the commander cannot take the wounded man with him; doing so would greatly reduce the group’s mobility and might
lead to the mission having to be aborted. But the commander cannot, equally, leave the wounded man alone. Consequently a simple and logical decision is
taken, to kill the wounded man. Spetsnaz has a very humane means of killing
its wounded soldiers—a powerful drug known to the men as ‘Blessed Death’.
An injection with the drug stops the pain and quickly produces a state of blissful drowsiness. In the event that a commander decides, out of misguided humanity, to take
the wounded man with him, and it
looks as if this might jeopardise the mission, the deputy commander is under orders to dispatch both the wounded man and the commander. The commander is removed without recourse to drugs. It is recommended that he be seized
from behind with a hand over his mouth and a knife blow to
his throat. If the deputy does not deal with his commander in this situation,
then not just the commander
and his deputy, but the
entire group may be regarded as traitors, with all the inevitable
consequences. As they leave the area of the drop the groups and sub-groups cover their tracks,
using methods that have been well known for centuries: walking
through water and over
stones, walking in each
other’s footsteps, and so forth. The groups lay more mines behind
them and spread more powder against dogs. After leaving the drop zone and having made sure that they are not being followed, the
commander gives orders for the organisation of a base and a
reserve base, safe places
concealed from the view of
outsiders. Long before a war
GRU officers, working abroad in the guise of diplomats, journalists,
consuls and other representatives of the USSR, choose places
suitable for establishing bases. The
majority of GRU
officers have been at some
time very closely familiar with spetsnaz, or are themselves spetsnaz officers, or have worked in the Intelligence Directorate of a district or group of forces. They know what is needed
for a base to be convenient and
safe. Bases can be of all sorts
and kinds. The ideal base
would be a hiding place
beneath ground level, with a
drainage system, running water, a supply of food, a radio set to pick up the local news and some simple means of transport. I have already described how
spetsnaz agents, recruited locally, can establish the more elaborate bases which are used by the professional groups of athletes carrying out exceptionally important tasks. In the majority of cases the base will be somewhere like a cave, or an abandoned quarry, or an
underground passage in a
town, or just a secluded place among the undergrowth in a dense
forest. A spetsnaz group can leave
at the base all the heavy equipment
it does not need
immediately. The existence of even the most rudimentary base enables it
to operate without having
to carry much with it in the way of equipment or
supplies. The approaches to the base are always guarded and the access
paths mined—the closest with
ordinary mines and the more
distant ones with warning mines which explode with much noise and a bright flash, alerting any
people in the base of approaching danger. When the group moves
off to carry out its task, a few men normally remain behind to
guard the base, choosing convenient observation points from which to keep
an eye on it. In the event of
its being discovered the
guard leaves the location quietly and makes for the reserve base,
leaving warnings of the danger to the rest of the group in an agreed place. The main group returning from
its mission will visit the reserve base first
and only then go to the main base. There is a double safeguard here: the
group may meet the guards in the reserve base and so avoid falling
into a trap; otherwise the group will see the warning signals left by the guards. The craters from
exploded mines around the base may also serve as warnings of danger. If the worst comes to
the worst, the guards can give warning of danger by
radio. A spetsnaz group may also have a moving base. Then it can operate at night,
unhampered by heavy burdens, while the guards
cart all the group’s heavy
equipment along by other routes. Each morning the group meets up with its mobile base. The
group replenishes its
supplies and then remains behind to rest or to set off on another operation,
while the base moves to another place. The most unexpected places can be used
by the mobile bases. I once
saw a base which looked simply like a pile of grass that had been
thrown down in the
middle of a field. The
soldiers’ packs and equipment
had been very carefully disguised, and the men guarding
the base were a kilometre away, also in a field
and camouflaged with grass. All around there were lots of convenient
ravines overgrown with young trees and bushes. That was where the KGB and MVD
units were looking for the spetsnaz base, and where the helicopters were circling overhead. It did not
occur to anybody that a base could be right in the middle of an open
field. In some cases a spetsnaz
group may capture a vehicle
for transporting its mobile
base. It might be an
armoured personnel carrier,
a truck or an ordinary car.
And if a group is engaged in very intensive fighting involving frequent
changes of location, then no base is organised. In the event of its being
pursued the group can abandon
all its heavy equipment,
having first removed the
safety pin from the remaining mines. In order to destroy a target it has first to be located. In the overwhelming majority of cases
a spetsnaz operation includes
the search for the
target. This is
understandable, since targets whose location is known and which are not movable can be destroyed
easily and quickly with missiles and
aircraft. But a great
number of targets in present-day fighting are mobile.
On the eve of a war or just after it has broken
out, government offices are
moved out of a country’s capital for secret command posts whose location is
known to very few people. New
communications centres and
lines are brought into operation. Aircraft are removed from
stationary aerodromes and dispersed to airfields established in places unknown to
the enemy. Many missile installations are moved to new concealed, and carefully guarded, locations. Troops and
headquarters are also relocated. In these circumstances the search for targets acquires paramount significance for spetsnaz. To be able to find a target of special importance, to identify
it, and to know how to distinguish real targets from false ones, become the most
important tasks for spetsnaz, more important even than the
destruction of the targets.
Once a target has been discovered it can be destroyed by other
forces—missiles, aircraft, marines, airborne troops. But a target that has
not been discovered cannot be destroyed by
anyone. Because the business of identifying targets is the most
important task for spetsnaz it
cannot be a separate
and independent
organisation. It can carry
out this task only if it relies on all the resources of the
GRU, and only if it can make use of information obtained
by agents and from all the various kinds of razvedka—satellite, aircraft,
naval, electronic, and so
forth. Every form of razvedka has its good and its bad side. A complete picture of what is
happening can be obtained only by making use of all forms of razvedka in close interaction one with another, compensating for the weaknesses of some forms
with the advantages of the others. Every officer in charge of razvedka uses
spetsnaz only where its use can give the very best result. When he sends a spetsnaz group behind
enemy lines the officer in command already knows a good deal about the
enemy from other sources. He knows exactly what the unit is to
look for and roughly where it has to look.
The information obtained by spetsnaz groups (sometimes only fragmentary
and uncertain) can in turn be of exceptional value to
the other forms of razvedka and be the starting point for more attentive
work in those areas by agents and other services. Only with a union of all
forces and resources is it
possible to reveal the plans and intentions of the enemy, the strength and
organisation of his forces,
and to inflict defeat on him. But let us return to the commander of the spetsnaz group who, despatching it to a particular area, already knows a good deal about the area, the specially important targets
that may be found there, and even their approximate location. This
information (or as much of it
as concerns him) is passed on
to the commander of the group
and his deputy. The group has
landed safely, covered its
tracks, established a base
and started its search. How
should it set about it? There are several tried and tested methods. Each target of special
importance must have a communications centre and lines of communication leading to it. The
group may include experts at radio razvedka. Let us
not forget that spetsnaz is the 3rd department and radio razvedka the 5th department of
the same Directorate (the Second) at the headquarters of every front,
fleet, group of forces and military district. Spetsnaz and radio razvedka are very closely connected and often
help each other, even to the
point of having radio razvedka experts in spetsnaz groups. By
monitoring radio
transmissions in the area of important targets it is possible to determine quite accurately
their whereabouts. But it is also possible to
discover the target without the aid of radio razvedka. The direction of receiving and transmitting aerials of tropospheric, radio-relay and other
communication lines provides a lot of information about the location of the terminal points on lines of communication. This in turn
leads us right up to the command posts and other targets of great
importance. Sometimes before a search
begins the commander of the group will decide by the map which, in his opinion, are the most likely locations for particular targets. His group
will examine those areas first of all. If the targets are moved,
then the roads, bridges, tunnels and mountain passes where they may be
seen are put under observation. The search for a particular
target can be carried out simultaneously by several groups. In that case the officer in charge divides the territory being searched into
squares in each of which one group operates. Each group searching a
square usually spreads out into a long line with tens or even hundreds
of metres between each man. Each man moves by the compass, trying to keep in
sight of his neighbours. They advance in complete silence. They choose suitable observation points
and carefully examine the
areas ahead of them, and if
they discover nothing they move on
to another hiding
place. In this way
relatively small groups of
well trained soldiers can keep quite extensive areas under observation.
Unlike razvedka conducted
from outer space or the air,
spetsnaz can get right up to
targets and view them, not from above, but from the ground. Experience shows that it
is much more difficult to deceive a spetsnaz man with false targets than
it is a man operating an electronic intelligence station or an expert at interpreting pictures taken from
the air or from space. Spetsnaz groups have recently begun to make ever greater use of electronic apparatus for seeking their targets. They now carry portable radar, infra-red and acoustic equipment,
night-vision sights, and so forth.
But whatever new
electronic devices are
invented, they will never
replace the simplest and most reliable method of establishing the location of important targets:
questioning a prisoner. It may be claimed that not every prisoner will agree to answer the questions put to him, or that some prisoners will
answer the questions put
by spetsnaz but give wrong
answers and lead their interrogators astray. To which my reply is categorical. Everybody
answers questions from spetsnaz. There are no exceptions. I have
been asked how long a very strong person can hold out against questioning
by spetsnaz, without replying to questions. The answer is: one
second. If you don’t believe this, just try the following experiment. Get one
of your friends who considers himself a strong character to write on a
piece of paper a number known only to himself and seal the paper in an envelope.
Then tie your friend to a
post or a tree and ask him
what number he wrote on the paper.
If he refuses to
answer, file his teeth down with a big file and count the time. Having received the answer, open the envelope and
check that he has given you the number written on the paper. I guarantee the
answer will be correct. If you perform such an experiment, you will have an idea of one of spetsnaz’s milder ways of questioning people. But there
are more effective and reliable ways of making a person talk. Everyone who
falls into the hands of spetsnaz
knows he is going to
be killed. But people exert themselves to give correct and precise
answers. They are not
fighting for their lives but for an
easy death. Prisoners are generally interrogated in twos or larger groups. If one seems to know less than the others, he can be used for demonstration purposes to encourage them to talk. If the questioning is being done in a town the
prisoner may have a heated iron placed on his body, or have his ears
pierced with an electric drill, or be cut to pieces with an electric saw.
A man’s fingers are particularly sensitive. If the finger of a man being
questioned is simply bent back and the end of the finger squashed as it
is bent, the pain is unendurable. One method considered very effective is
a form of torture known as ‘the bicycle’. A man is bound and laid on his back. Pieces of paper (or cotton wool or rags) soaked in spirit, eau-de-cologne, etc., are
stuck between his fingers and set alight. Spetsnaz has a special
passion for the sexual organs. If the conditions permit, a very old and simple method is used to demonstrate the power of
spetsnaz. The captors drive a big wedge into the trunk of a tree, then
force the victim’s sexual
organs into the opening and knock out the wedge. They then proceed to question the
other prisoners. At the same time, in order to make them more talkative, the principal spetsnaz weapon -- the little infantryman’s spade—is
used. As spetsnaz asks its
questions the blade of the
spade is used to cut off ears and fingers, to
hit the victims in the
liver and perform a whole
catalogue of unpleasant
operations on the person under interrogation. One very simple way of making a man talk is known as the ‘swallow’,
well known in Soviet concentration camps. It does not require any weapons
or other instruments, and if
it is used with discretion it does not leave any traces on the
victim’s body. He is laid face down on the ground and his legs are bent
back to bring his heels as
close as possible to the back of his neck. The ‘swallow’ generally
produces a straight answer in a matter of
seconds. Of course, every method
has its shortcomings. That is why a
commander uses several methods at the same time. The ‘swallow’ is not
usually employed in the early stages of an operation. Immediately after a landing, the commander of a
spetsnaz group tries to use
one really blood-thirsty
device out of his arsenal: cutting a man’s lips with a razor, or breaking his
neck by twisting his head
round. These methods are used even when a prisoner obviously has no information, the aim being to
prevent any possibility of any of the men in the group going over to the enemy. Everyone, including those who have
not taken part in the
torture, knows that after this
he has no choice:
he is bound to
his group by a bloody understanding and must either come out on top or die with his group. In case
of surrender he may have to
suffer the same torture as his friends have just
used. In recent years the KGB, GRU and
spetsnaz have had the
benefit of an enormous training ground in which to try out the effectiveness of their methods of
questioning:
Afghanistan. The
information received
from there describes
things which greatly exceed in
skill and inventiveness anything I have described here. I am quite deliberately not quoting
here interrogation methods used by the Soviet forces, including spetsnaz,
in Afghanistan, which have been
reported by thoroughly reliable sources. Western journalists have
access to that material and to living witnesses. Once it has obtained the information it needs about the targets of interest to it, the spetsnaz group checks the facts and then kills the prisoners. It should be particularly noted that those
who have told the truth do have an easy death. They may be shot, hanged, have their throats
cut or be drowned. Spetsnaz does not torture anybody for the sake of torture. You come across practically no sadists in spetsnaz. If they find one they
quickly get rid of him. Both
the easier and the
tougher forms of questioning
in spetsnaz are an unavoidable evil that the fighting
men have to accept. They use
these methods, not out of
a love of torturing
people, but as the simplest and most reliable way of obtaining information
essential to their purpose. Having discovered the target and reported on it to their command, spetsnaz will in most cases leave the
target area as quickly as possible. Very soon afterwards, the target will come under attack by missiles, aircraft or other
weapons. In a number of cases, however, the spetsnaz group will destroy the target it has
discovered itself. They are
often given the mission in that form: ‘Find and destroy’. But there are
also situations when the task
is given as ‘Find and report’, and the group
commander takes an
independent decision about destroying the target. He may do so when, having
found the target, he discovers suddenly that he cannot report to his superior officers about it; and he may also do so when he comes across a missile ready for
firing. Robbed of the chance or the time to transmit a report, the commander has to
take all possible steps to destroy the
target, including ordering a suicide attack on it. Readiness to carry out
a suicide mission is maintained in spetsnaz by many methods. One of them is to expose obvious sadists and have
them transferred immediately to other branches of the forces, because experience
shows that in the overwhelming
majority of cases the sadist is a coward, incapable of sacrificing
himself. The actual destruction of targets is perhaps the most ordinary and prosaic part of the entire operation. VIPs
are usually killed as
they are being
transported from one
place to another, when they
are at their most vulnerable. The weapons
include snipers’ rifles,
grenade-launchers or mines laid in the roadway. If a VIP enjoys travelling
by helicopter it is a very simple matter. For
one thing, a single helicopter is a better target than a number of cars, when the terrorists do not know exactly which car their victim is
travelling in. Secondly, even minor damage to a helicopter will
bring it down and almost certainly kill the VIP. Missiles and aircraft are also attacked with snipers’ rifles and grenade-launchers of various kinds. One bullet hole in a missile or an aircraft can put it out of action. If he cannot hit his target from a distance the commander of
the group will attack, usually from two sides. His deputy will attack with one group of men from one side, trying
to make as much noise and gunfire as possible, while the other group led by the commander will move,
noiselessly, as close to the
target as it can. It is obvious that an attack by a small spetsnaz
group on a well defended
target is suicide. But spetsnaz will do it. The fact is that even an unsuccessful attack on
a missile ready for firing
will force the enemy to re-check the whole missile
and all its supporting
equipment for faults. This
may delay the firing for valuable hours, which in a
nuclear war might be long enough to alter the course of the
conflict. |